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Overconfidence in Political Behavior †
By Pietro Ortoleva and Erik Snowberg *
This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the role of over-
confidence in political behavior. Our model of overconfidence in 
beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extreme-
ness, increased voter turnout, and stronger partisan identification. 
The model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ide-
ology in society. These predictions are tested using unique data that 
measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of 
a nationwide sample of over 3,000 adults. Our numerous predictions 
find strong support in these data. In particular, we document that 
overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predic-
tor of ideological extremeness, voter turnout, and partisan identifica-
tion. (JEL C83, D03, D72, D83)
Without heterogeneity in ideology—preferences and opinions over political 
actions—there would be little need for the institutions studied by political econ-
omists.1 However, the sources of ideology have received scant attention: since 
Marx, political economists have largely viewed ideology as driven by wealth or 
income—despite the fact that these variables explain little of the variation in ide-
ology (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Frank 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; 
Gelman 2009).
This paper proposes a complementary theory in which differences in ideology 
are also due to imperfect information processing. This theory predicts that over-
confidence in one’s own beliefs leads to ideological extremeness, increased voter 
1 Without heterogeneity, institutions will still be useful for coordination (Weingast 1997). Traditionally, opin-
ions have not been considered part of ideology; however, recent work has provided compelling arguments that 
ideology should include some beliefs (McMurray 2013a, b). 
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turnout, and stronger identification with political parties. Our predictions find strong 
support in a unique dataset that measures the overconfidence, and standard political 
characteristics, of a nationwide sample of over 3,000 adults. In particular, we find 
that overconfidence is the most reliable predictor of ideological extremeness and an 
important predictor of voter turnout in our data.
By adopting a behavioral basis for ideology, we help answer puzzling ques-
tions such as why politicians and voters are becoming more polarized despite the 
increased availability of information (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), or 
why political rumors and misinformation, such as “Global warming is a hoax,” 
are so persistent (Berinsky 2012).2 Moreover, as behavioral findings deepen our 
understanding of market institutions (Bertrand 2009; Baker and Wurgler 2013), 
a behavioral basis for ideology promises greater understanding of the design and 
consequences of political institutions (Callander 2007; Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv 
forthcoming).
In our model, overconfidence and ideology arise due to imperfect information 
processing. Citizens passively learn about a state variable through their experiences 
(signals). However, to varying degrees, citizens underestimate how correlated 
these experiences are, and thus, have different levels of overconfidence about their 
information. This underestimation—which we call correlational neglect—may 
have many sources. For example, citizens may choose to get information from a 
biased media outlet, but fail to fully account for the bias. Indeed, unbeknownst to 
most users, Google presents different news sources for the same search depending 
on a user’s location.3 Alternatively, exchanging information on a social network 
could lead to correlational neglect if citizens fail to understand that much of the 
information comes from people similar to themselves, if they fail to recognize the 
influence of their own previous reports on others’ current reports (DeGroot 1974; 
DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel 2003), or if they fail to account for the presence of 
rational herds (Eyster and Rabin 2010). Recent laboratory experiments find strong 
evidence of correlational neglect (Enke and Zimmermann 2013).
Our primary theoretical result is that overconfidence and ideological extremeness 
are connected. This follows an uncomplicated logic. For example, consider a 
citizen who notes the number of people in her neighborhood who are unemployed, 
and uses this information to deduce the state of the national economy. Suppose 
further that she lives in a neighborhood with high unemployment. If the citizen 
believes that the employment status of each person is relatively uncorrelated, she 
will think she has a lot of information about the state of the national economy 
(that is, she will be overconfident) and favor generous aid to the unemployed and 
loose monetary policy. If, instead, she realizes that local unemployment has a 
common cause—say, a factory shutting down—then she will understand that she 
has comparatively little information about the national economic situation, and 
2 In early 2013, 37 percent of US voters agreed with this statement (Public Policy Polling 2013). Only 41 
percent believe global warming is caused by human activity, compared with 97 percent of climate scientists (Yale 
Project on Climate Change Communication 2013). Similar levels of agreement with other political rumors or “con-
spiracy theories” are regularly found among voters (Berinsky 2012; Public Policy Polling 2013). 
3 See: http://vimeo.com/51181384. Actively seeking information that matches ones’ prior, or ignoring infor-
mation counter to it, is termed confirmation bias. Our model encompasses both of these structures of confirmation 
bias, but in other settings, such as elections, they may lead to different predictions (Levy and Razin forthcoming). 
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believe that although the situation is bad, it is not likely to be dire, and will support 
more moderate policies.
Our data—from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)—
strongly supports this prediction. A one standard deviation change in overconfidence 
is related to 12–28 percent of a standard deviation change in ideological extreme-
ness, depending on the specification. This relationship is as large as, and more sta-
ble than, the relationship between extremeness and economic variables. Indeed, the 
range of correlations for each economic variable includes points that are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that overconfidence is an important and dis-
tinct predictor of ideological extremeness.
The size and complexity of this data allows for the testing of more subtle predic-
tions. For example, if citizens become more conservative when they have more expe-
riences or signals, through aging or media exposure, then overconfidence should be 
correlated with conservatism. Moreover, extremism should be more correlated with 
overconfidence for conservatives than liberals. These results find robust support in 
the data.
To extend this model to voter turnout, we posit an expressive voting model in 
which the expressive value of voting is increasing with a citizen’s belief that one 
party’s policy is better for her (Matsusaka 1995; Degan and Merlo 2011; Degan 
2013). Similarly, strength of partisan identification is modeled as the probability a 
citizen places on her favored party’s policy being better for her.
As more overconfident citizens are more likely to believe that one or the other 
party is likely to have the right policy for them, they are more likely to turn out to 
vote. This is true even conditional on ideology. The opposite conditional statement 
also holds: more ideologically extreme citizens are more likely to vote, conditional 
on overconfidence. Thus, our model matches the well-known empirical regularity 
that more ideologically extreme citizens are more likely to vote. Similar predictions 
hold for strength of partisan identification.
This second set of predictions are, once again, robustly supported by the data. 
Using verified voter turnout data, we document that a one standard deviation change 
in overconfidence is associated with 7–19 percent increase in voter turnout. This 
is a more important predictor of turnout in our data than income, education, race, 
gender, or church attendance.
Finally, we theoretically analyze how our results would be altered by citizens 
choosing how much (costly) information to acquire, or communicating their 
ideology to each other. Both of these extensions strengthen our primary results. 
When citizens can acquire more information, it will be more overconfident 
citizens that do so. This occurs because more overconfident citizens neglect 
correlation to a greater degree, and hence believe that additional signals are more 
valuable. When citizens can communicate, more overconfident citizens will 
attribute differences in ideology to anything other than their own information 
being incorrect, and hence update less than less overconfident citizens. Both of 
these possibilities accentuate the correlation between ideological extremeness 
and overconfidence.
The remainder of this section provides more details on the behavioral phenomena 
of overconfidence, connects our work to the literature, and previews the structure of 
the paper.
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A. What is Overconfidence?
Overconfidence describes related phenomena in which a person thinks some 
aspect of his or hers, usually performance or information, is better than it actually 
is. These phenomena are the subject of a large literature in psychology, economics, 
and finance, having been first documented in Alpert and Raiffa (1982). This litera-
ture has documented overconfidence in a wide range of contexts, and among people 
from a wide range of backgrounds.
Moore and Healy (2007, 2008) divide overconfidence into three, often conflated, 
categories: over-estimation, over-placement, and over-precision. Over-estimation is 
when people believe that their performance on a task is better than it actually is. 
Over-placement is when people incorrectly believe that they perform better than 
others, as in the classic statement, “93 percent of drivers believe that they are better 
than average.” 4
In this paper we focus on over-precision: the belief that one’s information is 
more precise than it actually is. There are two reasons for this focus. First, while 
 over-estimation and over-placement often suffer from reversals,5 this does not seem 
to be the case for over-precision. In other words, it appears that (almost) every-
one exhibits over-precision (almost) all the time (Moore and Healy 2007, 2008). 
Second, over-precision has a very natural interpretation in political contexts: it is 
the result of people believing that their own experiences are more informative about 
policy than they actually are. Despite our narrower focus, we continue to use the 
term overconfidence.
Overconfidence is usually a modeling fundamental. By contrast, as noted above, 
we derive it as a consequence of correlational neglect. This allows for the derivation 
of additional predictions on the evolution of overconfidence and extremism with age 
and media exposure.
B. Literature
This work contributes to the emerging literature on behavioral political econ-
omy, which applies findings from behavioral economics to understand the causes 
and consequences of political behavior.6 This approach promises to allow political 
economists to integrate the insights of a half-century of psychology-based political 
behavior studies.
A particular appeal of applying behavioral insights to political economy is that 
many of the feedback mechanisms that have led scholars to doubt the importance of 
behavioral phenomena in markets do not seem to exist in politics. Specifically, as an 
individual’s political choice is unlikely to be pivotal, citizens who make poor polit-
ical choices do not suffer worse consequences than those who make good political 
choices. Moreover, this lack of direct feedback drastically reduces a citizen’s ability 
4 Interestingly, this may be perfectly rational (see Benoît and Dubra 2011). 
5 That is, people tend to under-estimate their performance when a task is easy, and over-estimate when the task 
is difficult (Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu 1994). 
6 This literature is small, and includes Matsusaka (1995); Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting (2003); Bendor et al. 
(2011); Callander and Wilson (2006, 2008); Bisin, Lizzeri, and Yariv (forthcoming); Degan and Merlo (2011); 
Lizzeri and Yariv (2012); and Passarelli and Tabellini (2013). 
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to learn of her bias. This is in stark contrast to markets, where poor choices directly 
impact the decision maker, which some scholars argue will eliminate behavioral 
biases. Furthermore, behavioral traits that may be detrimental in markets may, in 
some cases, be useful in facilitating collective action (Bénabou and Tirole 2002, 
2006; Bénabou 2008).
Two papers focus on the normative implications of correlational neglect in politi-
cal economy. Glaeser and Sunstein (2009) study “credulous Bayesian” information 
transmission in groups. This follows models in which correlational neglect is related 
to network structure (DeGroot 1974; DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel 2003; Golub 
and Jackson 2010; Chandrasekhar, Larreguy, and Xandri 2012). It notes that this 
bias may lead to group polarization, overconfidence in beliefs, and worse aggregate 
decision making. Levy and Razin (forthcoming), in contrast, show that correlational 
neglect may lead to better information aggregation in elections. Our work has a 
different focus: we present a general model of correlational neglect, and derive and 
test positive results to understand the interrelationships between overconfidence, 
ideology, extremism, turnout, party identification, media exposure, and age.
This paper is related to a number of additional literatures. First and foremost, 
the study of ideology, voting, and partisan identification are the subject of a large 
literature in political science. Second, overconfidence is the focus of a large liter-
ature in behavioral economics and finance (see, for example, Odean 1998; Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998; Camerer and Lovallo 1999; Santos-Pinto and 
Sobel 2005). Third, there are a small number of papers that study the role of beliefs 
on preferences for redistribution (Piketty 1995; Alesina and Angeletos 2005). Fourth, 
our modeling technique comes from the small literature utilizing the normal learn-
ing model.7 Finally, our model of turnout follows those in which voters are either 
regret- or choice-avoidant (Matsusaka 1995; Degan and Merlo 2011; Degan 2013).8
C. Structure
This paper is unconventionally structured: it rotates between theoretical and 
empirical results. This allows for the data to inform the theoretical analysis, and 
clarifies the role that assumptions play in results. Section I introduces the theo-
retical structure and Section II gives an overview of our data. Our analysis begins 
in Section IIIA with an examination of how overconfidence and ideology evolve 
with the number of signals. This preliminary check shows that implications of our 
model that differ from a fully Bayesian benchmark find strong support in our data. 
Section IIIB examines our primary result: the correlation between overconfidence 
and ideological extremeness. In addition, the restrictions from the previous sub-
section allow for predictions about ideology and overconfidence. The final two 
subsections of Section III examine additional, more subtle, predictions about the 
relationships between overconfidence, ideology, and extremeness.
7 Although the literature is not large, it cannot be completely reviewed here. Early papers include Zechman 
(1979) and Achen (1992). For a recent review, see the introduction of Bullock (2009). In this literature, our model 
is closest to Blomberg and Harrington (2000), although like all fully Bayesian models, this model is inconsistent 
with the data here, as discussed in Section IIIA. 
8 For a discussion of how our results relate to other models of voter turnout, see the online Appendix. 
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Section IV adds the expressive voting structure that allows our model to generate 
predictions for turnout and partisan identification. Section V examines theoretically 
how our results would change if citizens could acquire additional information. Finally, 
Section VI discusses issues related to identification, and directions for future work.
I. Theoretical Framework
This section presents our model and formally defines correlational neglect and 
overconfidence. This is followed by a discussion of our data, and how we use it to con-
struct measures of overconfidence, ideology, voter turnout, and partisan identification.
There is a unit measure of citizens  i ∈ [0, 1] . Each citizen  i has a utility over 
political actions that depends on a state of the world. A citizen’s beliefs about the 
state are determined by her experiences, and ideology encompasses both beliefs 
about the state and preferences.
Utilities.—Each citizen  i has a standard quadratic-loss utility over actions 
a i ∈ ℝ , which depends on a state  x ∈ ℝ , and a preference bias  b i 
  U( a i ,  b i | x) = − ( a i −  b i − x) 2 . 
Throughout this paper,  a i is the policy implemented by the government. A citizen’s 
preference bias is an i.i.d. draw from a normal distribution with mean  0 and preci-
sion  τ b . We write this as  b i ∼   [0,  τ b ] . The state  x is a single draw from    [0, τ ] .
With uncertainty about the state, it is straightforward to show that the policy pre-
ferred by citizen  i will be  a i ∗ =  b i +  E i [x] , where  E i is the expectation taken over 
citizen  i ’ s beliefs. We define this quantity as the citizen’s ideology,
(1)   i ≡  b i +  E i [x], 
and, as the expectation of  x is zero, ideological extremeness as   i ≡ |   i | .
Experiences, Beliefs, and Correlational Neglect.—The core of the model is the 
process by which citizens form beliefs about the state. In our model, each citizen 
is well calibrated about the informativeness of individual experiences, but under-
estimates how correlated her experiences are. This will lead to varying degrees of 
overconfidence in the population.
Each citizen starts with the correct prior    [0, τ ] about the state. Citizens have 
multiple experiences over time, which are signals about the state,  e it = x +  ε it , 
t ∈ {1, 2, … ,  n i } , with  e it independent of  b i , that is  e it ⊥  b i . Each  ε it ∼  [0, 1] , 
and the signals are correlated, with  corr[ ε it ,  ε i t ′  ] = ρ . However, citizen  i underesti-
mates this correlation: she believes  corr[ ε it ,  ε i t ′  ] =  ρ i ∈ [0, ρ) .9
9 Formally,  ε i is distributed according to a mean-zero multinomial normal with covariance matrix
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Each  ε it has unit variance, so  corr[ ε it ,  ε it ′] = cov[ ε it ,  ε it ′] = ρ .
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DEFINITION 1: A citizen suffers from correlational neglect when  ρ i < ρ .
The magnitude of correlational neglect varies by citizen, and is an i.i.d. draw from 
F  ρ i  with support  [0, ρ) , and  ρ i ⊥ ( e it ,  b i ) . As  ρ i < ρ for all  i , all citizens in our 
model are correlational neglecters.
For tractability, we assume  n i , the number of signals received by citizen  i , is 
exogenous. Section VA relaxes this assumption, and shows that more overconfident 
citizens value additional information more highly, and thus endogenizing the acqui-
sition of information strengthens our results.
Overconfidence.—As our data measures overconfidence, our theoretical results 
are in terms of this variable. Denote the precision of citizen  i ’s posterior belief as 
κ i + τ , which we refer to as the citizen’s confidence. Additionally, denote by  κ + τ 
the posterior belief the citizen would have if she had accurate beliefs about the cor-
relation between signals.
DEFINITION 2: Overconfidence is the difference between a citizen’s confidence 
and how confident she would be if she were properly calibrated,  κ i − κ . Given two 
citizens  i and  j , we say that  i is more overconfident than  j if  κ i ≥  κ j > 0 .10
We often refer to  κ i as a citizen’s level of overconfidence.
Before discussing data, we briefly comment on the interpretation of  x . Research 
that uses a similar utility function sees this state variable as informative of optimal 
policy. However, this may lead to unappealing normative implications. In particular, 
it suggests that the optimal policy could be found by studying the distribution of 
public opinion, and that this policy may be more extreme than the median of fairly 
extreme groups. To keep the same structure, but eliminate such conclusions, we 
could simply add an aggregate bias to the signaling structure.11 As this additional 
uncertainty affects every citizen in the same way, it does not affect most of our con-
clusions. However, it would affect how citizens learn from each other, a subject we 
examine in Section VB.
II. Data
Our data comes from the Harvard and Caltech modules of the 2010 Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES) (Alvarez 2010; Ansolabehere 2010a, b). This 
data is unique (as far as we know) in that it allows a survey-based measure of over-
confidence in beliefs as well as political characteristics.
The CCES is an annual cooperative survey. Participating institutions purchase a 
module of at least 1,000 respondents, who are asked 10–15 minutes of customized 
questions. In addition, every respondent across all modules is asked the same bat-
tery of basic economic and political questions. The complete survey is administered 
Alternatively, we could model the state in a multidimensional space with multidimensional errors over time, and 
citizens either underestimate the amount of correlation between dimensions, or across time, or both. This does not 
add to the testable predictions of the model (see the online Appendix). 
10 All results hold defining overconfidence as  κ i /κ . 
11 This would be expressed formally as:  ε it ∼  [ π 0 , 1] with  π 0 ∼  [0, 1] identical for all citizens. 
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online by Knowledge Networks. Each module uses a matched-random sampling 
technique to achieve a representative sample, with oversampling of certain groups 
(Ansolabehere 2012; Ansolabehere and Rivers 2013).
A. Overconfidence
The most important feature of this data, for our purposes, is that it allows for 
a measure of overconfidence. This measure is constructed from four subjective 
questions about respondent confidence in their guesses about four factual quanti-
ties, adjusting for a respondent’s accuracy on the factual question. This is similar 
to the standard psychology measure in that it elicits confidence and controls for 
knowledge. However, it differs in that we cannot say for certain whether a given 
respondent is overconfident, just that their confidence, conditional on knowledge, 
is higher or lower than another respondent. Therefore, we use previous research, 
which shows that (almost) everyone exhibits over-precision (almost) all the time 
(Moore and Healy 2007, 2008) to argue that this is a measure of overconfidence.12
The factual and confidence questions were asked as part of another set of stud-
ies (Ansolabehere, Meredith, and Snowberg 2013, 2014). Respondents were asked 
their assessment of the current unemployment and inflation rate, and what the unem-
ployment and inflation rate would be a year from the date of the survey. Respondents 
were then asked their confidence about their answer to each factual question on a 
qualitative, six-point scale.
Confidence reflects both knowledge and overconfidence, so subtracting knowl-
edge from confidence leaves overconfidence.13 To subtract knowledge, we deduct 
points from a respondent’s reported confidence based on his or her accuracy, and 
thus knowledge, on the corresponding factual question. This is implemented conser-
vatively: we regress confidence on an arbitrary, fourth-order polynomial of accuracy, 
and use the residual as a measure of overconfidence.14 This allows the regression to 
pick the points to deduct for each level of accuracy, such that knowledge absorbs as 
much variation as possible.
Each of the resultant overconfidence measures are measured with error, as some 
respondents with little knowledge will randomly provide accurate answers. Thus, 
we use the first principal component of the four measures.15 Finally, to standard-
ize regression coefficients, we subtract the minimum level of overconfidence, and 
divide by the standard deviation.
12 Psychological studies typically elicit a large (up to 150) number of 80 percent confidence intervals and count 
the percent of times that the actual answer falls within a subject’s confidence interval. This number, subtracted from 
80, is used as a measure of overconfidence. Our measure has advantages over the typical psychology approach: see 
the online Appendix, which also contains all survey questions. 
13 Theoretically, we need to control for the precision a citizen would have if they were properly calibrated. As 
we do not observe this, we control for accuracy, which is, in our theory, correlated. 
14 That is, we use a semi-nonparametric sieve method to control for knowledge (Chen 2007). Ideally one 
would impose a monotonic control function; however, doing so is methodologically opaque (see Athey and Haile 
2007; Henderson et al. 2009). In keeping with the treatment of these factual questions in Ansolabehere, Meredith, 
and Snowberg (2013, 2014), we topcode responses to the unemployment and inflation questions at 25, limiting a 
respondent’s inaccuracy. 
15 Consistent with each measure consisting of an underlying dimension plus i.i.d. measurement error, the first 
principal component weights each of the four questions approximately equally. Also consistent with this structure, 
our results are substantively similar using any one of the four questions in isolation. So, for example, they hold if 
we use only variables pertaining to present conditions, or only to future predictions. 
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In keeping with previous research, overconfidence is strongly correlated with a 
respondent’s gender, as shown in Table 1 (see, for example, Lundeberg, Fox, and 
Punc´cohar´ 1994). Section IIIA predicts that overconfidence is correlated with age. 
This is also clear in Table 1. This predicted relationship leads us to cluster standard 
errors by age.16 Additionally, as the CCES oversamples certain groups, such as vot-
ers, we estimate specifications using weighted least squares (WLS) and the supplied 
sample weights (Ansolabehere 2012).
However, overconfidence is uncorrelated with education or income. Note that these 
latter controls are ordered categorical variables, so we provide  F -tests on the 5 and 
15 dummy variables that, respectively, represent these categories. For comparison, 
we construct a confidence measure from the first principal component of confidence 
scores. Education and income are related to this measure, providing some confirma-
tion that actual knowledge has been purged from the overconfidence measure.17
While the data we use to elicit overconfidence is quite similar to that used in psy-
chology, there are some differences. First, we use questions about economic mea-
sures—unemployment, inflation—as opposed to general knowledge questions: for 
example, “When was Shakespeare born?” Second, these questions elicit confidence 
directly, while studies in psychology typically elicit confidence intervals. To under-
stand whether our slightly different approach provides similar results, we added 
four general knowledge questions—eliciting confidence with an interval—to the 
2011 CCES. The 2011 CCES also included the confidence questions from the 2010 
version. The main finding is reassuring: the results we can examine in the (more lim-
ited) 2011 CCES hold using general knowledge-based measures of overconfidence. 
These results can be found in Section VIA, and more about using surveys to measure 
overconfidence can be found in the online Appendix.
16 Age also has a greater intraclass correlation than state of residence, education, or income, making age the 
most conservative choice. The intraclass correlation is small for all of these variables, thus clustering on any one of 
them produces similar results, which are also similar to heteroskedastistic-consistent standard errors. For consis-
tency, we continue to cluster by age when age is on the right-hand side. Classical standard errors are approximately 
25 percent smaller. 
17 All our results—theoretical and empirical—hold using confidence rather than overconfidence. 
Table 1—Overconfidence Is Correlated with Gender and Age,  
But Not Education or Income
Overconfidence Confidence
Gender (male) 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.46***(0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077)
Age (in years) 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013***(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022)
Education F = 1.11 F = 2.03
p = 0.36 p = 0.08
Income F = 1.34 F = 1.82
p = 0.20 p = 0.05
Observations 2,927
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by age (73 clusters), in parentheses. All specifications esti-
mated using WLS with CCES sampling weights.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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B. Dependent Variables
The predictions in this paper concern three types of dependent variables: ideol-
ogy, voter turnout, and strength of partisan identification.
Ideology.—This study uses one main and two alternative measures of ideology. 
The main measure is scaled ideology from Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2011), which 
they generously provided to us. This measure is generated using item response the-
ory (IRT) to scale responses to 18 issue questions asked on the CCES—for example, 
questions about abortion and gun control. A similar process generates the Nominate 
Scores used to evaluate the ideology of members of Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 
1985).18
Our alternative measures of ideology are direct self-reports. The CCES twice 
asks respondents to report their ideology: from extremely liberal to extremely con-
servative. The first elicitation is when the respondent agrees to participate in surveys 
(on a five-point scale), and the second when taking the survey (on a seven-point 
scale). We normalize each of these measures to the interval  [−1, 1] , and average 
them. Those who report they “don’t know” are either dropped from the sample or 
treated as moderates (0). Results are presented for both cases. These self-reported 
measures are imperfectly correlated with scaled ideology (0.42).19
Voter Turnout.—Turnout is ascertained from the voting rolls of the state in which 
a respondent lives. Voter rolls vary in quality between states, but rather than trying to 
control for this directly, we include state fixed effects in most of our specifications.20
Partisan Identification.—At the time of the survey, respondents were asked 
whether they identify with the Republican or Democratic Party, or neither. If they 
report one of the political parties—for example the Democrats—they are then asked 
if they are a “Strong Democrat” or “Not so Strong Democrat.” Those who report 
they were neither Republican nor Democrat were asked if they lean to one party 
or the other, and are allowed to say that they do not lean toward either party. Those 
who report they are strong Democrats or Republicans are coded as strong partisan 
identifiers. Independents—those who do not lean toward either party—are coded as 
either strong party identifiers, weak party identifiers, or are left out of the analysis. 
Results are presented for all three resultant measures.
18 There are many ways to aggregate these individual issues into ideology. For example, one could aggregate 
groups of related issues into different ideological dimensions. To eliminate concerns about specification searching, 
we prefer to use a measure generated by other scholars (see the online Appendix). 
19 In improving and refining the paper in accordance with referee suggestions, we eliminated a number of spec-
ifications found in the working paper (Ortoleva and Snowberg 2013). This working paper includes more specifica-
tions with alternative ideology measures, extremism measures that are constructed directly from ideology without 
first controlling for economic variables, demographic controls, and unweighted specifications. The results in all 
cases are similar. 
20 The state of Virginia did not make their rolls available, so the 60 respondents from Virginia are dropped from 
turnout regressions (see Ansolabehere and Hersh 2010). Classifying as nonvoters the 42 respondents who were 
found to have voted in the primary but not the general election does not significantly alter the results. 
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C. Controls
Economic Controls.—Political economy theories generally view ideology as a 
function of wealth or income. Therefore, we include controls for all the wealth- and 
income-related variables in the CCES. The CCES provides these controls as catego-
ries: for example, rather than providing years of education, it groups education into 
categories such as “Finished High School.” Thus, we introduce a dummy variable 
for each category of each economic control. We also include a category for missing 
data for each variable. These controls are: income (16 categories), education (6 cat-
egories), stock ownership (3 categories), home ownership (4 categories), union/
union member in household (8 categories), state (52 categories, including DC and 
missing).
Number of Signals.—The CCES contains two sets of questions that are reason-
able proxies for the number of signals: media exposure and age. The CCES contains 
four questions that ask whether or not a respondent received news from a specific 
media channel: blogs, TV, radio, and newspapers. We take the first principal com-
ponent of these four yes/no questions to create a more continuous index of media 
exposure. This principal component also deemphasizes TV, as nearly all respon-
dents report getting political information from this channel. Age is calculated as 
2010—the year of the survey—minus birth year.
All controls are entered categorically. This strategy is both too conservative and 
not conservative enough. Not conservative enough because there are likely other 
relevant unobserved factors, and too conservative, as entering these variables cate-
gorically allows the implied control function to be nonmonotonic, as opposed to the 
theoretical monotonic relationship. There are 16 categories of media exposure, and 
73 categories (years) for age.
III. Ideology, Extremeness, and Overconfidence
We begin our analysis by contrasting our model with fully Bayesian models, and 
then continue to our primary results.
A. Media, Age, Overconfidence, and Ideology
Our model is partially Bayesian—citizens update using Bayes’ rule, but with 
an incorrect likelihood function. Obvious alternative models are fully Bayesian, in 
which citizens are correct about the link between their experiences and the state  x , 
and citizens eventually learn  x . In this subsection we show that such alternative 
models are incompatible with an important feature of the data: ideological extreme-
ness increases with the number of experiences (signals).
In particular, consider any fully Bayesian model in which citizens’ priors have 
full support, and they receive  n private signals. Then there exists some  n ∗ such that 
if  n >  n ∗ the variance of citizens’ posterior means is non-increasing in  n . Note 
the fact that citizens’ posterior means may initially diverge is due to the fact that if 
citizens have a common prior mean, the first signal(s) will cause divergence. After 
these initial signals, the variance of posterior means must weakly decrease as more 
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information is revealed and citizens learn  x . Of course, if all citizens’ prior means 
are  x , then posteriors need never diverge or converge.
This implies that the population variance of ideology, conditional on  n ,  var[  i | n] 
is non-increasing in  n in fully Bayesian models. In contrast, in our model:
PROPOSITION 1:
 (i ) Overconfidence is increasing with the number of experiences (signals)  n .
 (i i) The mean ideology in the population, conditional on  n ,  E[  i | n] , is increasing 
in  n if and only if  x > 0 , and decreasing in  n if and only if   x < 0 .
 (i ii) If  ρ is large enough,  var[  i | n] is increasing in  n .
PROOF: 
All proofs can be found in the online Appendix.
To build intuition for Proposition 1, consider the extreme case in which  ρ i = 0 
and  ρ = 1 : that is, when experiences are perfectly correlated, but citizen  i believes 
that they are independent. In this case, each experience is identical, so it will make 
the citizen more confident without increasing her information—leading to the first 
part of the proposition. Moreover, as the mean of the ideology distribution will tend 
toward  x as  n increases, if  x > 0 , then ideology will increase with  n .
The final part of Proposition 1 implies that under certain parameter values our 
model is compatible with patterns that are incompatible with fully Bayesian models: 
citizens’ beliefs could become more polarized with more signals. To understand the 
difference, note that when  ρ is large in our model, then each additional signal con-
tains very little new information, yet some citizens believe it does. New signals will 
thus push their beliefs toward a biased view of  x , rendering subjects more polarized. 
As described above, this would not be the case in a fully Bayesian model, as citizens 
beliefs will converge toward  x —or, at least, not diverge.
Before turning to the empirical examination of this proposition, we note that this 
proposition provides a potential answer to the first puzzle posed in the introduction: 
why politicians and voters are becoming more polarized, despite the increased avail-
ability of information through the Internet (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). 
The third part of the proposition suggests that an increase in the number of signals 
can actually increase ideological extremeness, and thus, polarization. This occurs 
because additional signals are correlated, and thus provide limited additional infor-
mation. Citizens neglect this correlation, and thus update too much, which increases 
polarization. Note that this occurs even if media exposure is not more polarized, as 
seems to be the case (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011).
Empirical Analysis.—We examine the patterns suggested by Proposition 1, using 
media exposure as a measure of  n , in Figure 1. The visual patterns in Figure 1 are 
found to be statistically robust in Table 2. Each panel of Figure 1 shows a smoothed, 
nonparametric fit with 95 percent confidence intervals, and averages for each value 
of the media index. The first panel shows that, in accordance with Proposition 1, 
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overconfidence increases with media exposure. The second panel shows that 
 ideological extremeness increases with media exposure. The third and fourth panels 
show that this is due to both a rightward shift associated with more media exposure, 
Figure 1. Media Exposure, Overconfidence, and Ideology
Notes: Each point is the average for those respondents with a specific index of media exposure intensity (that is, 
blogs, tv, radio, and newspaper) rounded to the nearest integer. Trendiness, in black, and 95 percent confidence 
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Table 2—Regressions Support the Visual Patterns in Figure 1
Overconfidence Ideology Squared deviation
Media index 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.059** 0.055** 0.29*** 0.19***
(0.041) (0.038) (0.023) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028)
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes
Age (73 categories) Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.042 0.23 0.035 0.17 0.085 0.26
Age 0.20*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.066** 0.16*** 0.14***(0.037) (0.038) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes
Media (16 categories) Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.040 0.19 0.014 0.16 0.027 0.24
Observations 2,927 2,868 2,868
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by age (73 clusters), in parentheses. All specifications estimated using WLS with 
CCES sampling weights. Coefficients on age are standardized. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and an increase in ideological dispersion. This, along with the second and third 
parts of Proposition 1, implies certain restrictions on the parameters of the model. 
In particular:
IMPLICATION 1:  x > 0 .21
IMPLICATION 2:  ρ is large enough so that  var[  i | n] is increasing in  n .
The second implication can be examined in other datasets: Ortoleva and Snowberg 
(forthcoming) replicates the fourth panel of Figure 1 over several decades using data 
from the American National Election Survey.
While the fourth panel of Figure 1 shows that the data is inconsistent with any 
fully Bayesian model, neither it nor the third panel is a test of our model. Specifically, 
the second and third part of Proposition 1 allows for either an increasing or decreas-
ing relationship, depending on parameter values. Moreover, in proving this result 
we have assumed that media exposure is exogenous, which is unlikely to hold. We 
address this issue in two ways. First, we show theoretically in Section VA that endog-
enizing media exposure strengthens our results. Intuitively, this occurs because more 
overconfident citizens neglect correlation to a greater degree, and thus believe that 
additional signals are more valuable. They will thus consume more media, becom-
ing more overconfident, and more extreme.
Second, we also examine our results using another proxy for the number of sig-
nals: age. Age is not a choice, nor is it likely to be affected by one’s overconfidence 
or ideology. Moreover, as we have already made parametric restrictions on the 
basis of Figure 1, Proposition 1 now gives testable predictions for the relationships 
between age, overconfidence, ideology, and extremeness. In particular, the patterns 
with respect to age should be the same as those with respect to media. These predic-
tions are tested, and shown to hold, in Table 2. Moreover, the regressions show that 
the patterns with respect to age are robust to controlling for media, and vice versa.
To summarize, the patterns in the data are inconsistent with any fully Bayesian 
model, but are consistent with our theory. Moreover, to draw additional, testable 
predictions, we use the implications of these patterns as assumptions in some of 
what follows. When doing so, we state it explicitly.
B. Ideological Extremeness
Our primary result is:
PROPOSITION 2: Overconfidence and ideological extremeness are positively cor-
related. This is true conditional on  n , and independent of  n if  ρ is large enough.22
21 Note that this does not imply that conservative citizens are “correct” (see the end of Section I). 
22 Specifically, this holds as long as  ρ is large enough that the population variance of ideology, conditional on  n , 
 var[  i | n] , is increasing in  n (see Proposition 1). 
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To build the intuition of this result, it is useful to recast our model as one in which 
citizens receive only a single signal, but overestimate its precision. Specifically, 
we can model each citizen as if they have a single experience  e i = x +  ε i , where ε i ∼   [0, κ] , ∀ i . However, citizens overestimate the precision of this signal: that 
is, they believe that  ε i ∼   [0,  κ i ] , where  κ i ≥ κ . If we properly define  e i ,  κ , 
and  κ i , then this model will give the same results when there is no heterogeneity 
in  n .
LEMMA 1: Define  e i ≡  1 __  n i   ∑ t=1  n i   e it . Then  κ =   n i  _________ 1 + ( n i − 1)ρ , and  κ i =   n i  _________ 1 + ( n i − 1) ρ i .
Fix  n and consider two citizens with the same preference bias  b = 0 and the 
same experience  e ≥ 0 , but two different levels of overconfidence  κ 1 and  κ 2 , 
with  κ 1 >  κ 2 . Using the definition of ideology in (1) and Bayes’ rule:   i =  b i + 
 E i [x] =   κ i e ____ τ +  κ i , where  E i is the expectation over citizen  i ’s beliefs. As citizens’ mean 
beliefs, and hence ideology, are increasing in  κ i , then the more overconfident cit-
izen will have a more extreme ideology. Intuitively, the more overconfident citi-
zen believes her experience is a better signal of the state, and hence updates more, 
becoming more extreme.
To see that this results in a positive correlation, we examine the entire distribu-
tion of ideologies. The logic above implies that the distribution of ideologies for 
those who are more overconfident will be more spread out than the distribution for 
those who are less overconfident. Figure 2 shows the distribution of ideologies for 
two levels of overconfidence with  x = 0 . In that figure, as one moves further from 
the ideological center, citizens are more likely to be more overconfident, gener-
ating a positive correlation between overconfidence and ideological extremeness. 
The simplicity of the figure is driven by the assumption that  x = 0 : if  x ≠ 0 , the 
distributions will not be neatly stacked on top of each other, and the relationship 
will be more complex—but Proposition 2 shows that there is a positive correlation 






519ortoleva and snowberg: overconfidence in political behaviorvol. 105 no. 2
between overconfidence and ideological extremeness for any value of  x .23 Using 
Implication 1 we can also derive an additional prediction:
PROPOSITION 3: If   x > 0 overconfidence and ideology are positively correlated, 
both independent of, and conditional on,  n .
Proposition 3 follows directly from the discussion above. As the full distribution of 
e i is unbiased,  E[  i |  κ i ] =   κ i x ____ 1 +  κ i . When  x > 0 , this is increasing in  κ i .
Empirical Analysis.—As political economy theories generally view ideology as 
a function of wealth or income, we first control for the effect of economic vari-
ables—as listed in Section IIC—on ideology. We then take the absolute value of the 
residuals from these regressions as measures of ideological extremeness. All three 
measures of ideology and ideological extremeness are divided by their standard 
error to standardize regression coefficients. The first three columns of Table 3 show 
both an empirical examination of Proposition 3, and the regression, in the second 
column, used to construct the ideological extremeness measure.
We now examine our primary prediction—Proposition 2—by regressing the 
resultant measure of ideological extremeness on overconfidence. The relationship 
between ideological extremeness and overconfidence is statistically very robust—
with t-statistics on this novel result between  ∼ 5 and  ∼ 10.24
While we have shown that the relationship between ideological extremeness or 
ideology and overconfidence is statistically robust, is it substantively important? 
Table 4 suggests the answer is yes. Specifically, it shows the change in ideologi-
cal extremeness, and ideology, associated with a one standard deviation change in 
the various economic controls. As the table shows, overconfidence is as predictive 
23 The proof of Proposition 2 relies on the fact that both overconfidence and extremeness are increasing in 
correlational neglect. Any distribution of noise that has this property will produce the same results. For more dis-
cussion, see the online Appendix. 
24 The closest empirical result we are aware of appears in footnote 14 of Kuklinski et al. (2000), which notes a 
strong correlation ( 0.34 ) between strength of partisan identification and confidence in incorrect opinions. 
Table 3—Overconfidence Is Robustly Related to Ideology and Extremeness
Ideology
Ideological extremeness 
purged of economic controls
Overconfidence 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.12***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of signals Yes Yes
R2 0.048 0.16 0.23 0.055 0.19 0.29
Observations 2,868
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by age (73 clusters), in parentheses. All specifications esti-
mated using WLS with CCES sampling weights. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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of ideological extremeness as income, education, and stock ownership, and more 
predictive than union membership, home ownership, or age. Moreover, as this rela-
tionship is more consistent across specifications, it suggests that overconfidence is 
a separate phenomenon that is not captured by standard controls. A similar pattern 
emerges for left-right ideology. It is worth noting that income and education are 
fairly stable predictors of left-right ideology, although they are not as substantively 
important as overconfidence.
C. Differences between Left and Right
We now use Implication 1 ( x > 0 ) to draw additional, subtle, predictions from 
the model.
PROPOSITION 4: If  x > 0 then  cov[,  κ i |   i ≥ 0] > cov[,  κ i |   i ≤ 0] both 
independent of, and conditional on,  n .
PROPOSITION 5: If  x > 0 and  ρ is large enough then  cov[,  n i |   i ≥ 0] > 
cov[,  n i |   i ≤ 0] .25
Proposition 4 states that if  x > 0 , then the covariance between overconfidence 
and extremeness is larger for those to the right-of-center than for those to the 
 left-of-center. The mathematical intuition is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3, 
which uses three different levels of  κ i . Moving right from the center, average over-
confidence is quickly increasing, along with ideological extremeness. This leads to 
a large covariance between overconfidence and ideological extremeness. Moving 
left, ideological extremeness is also increasing, but average overconfidence initially 
decreases. Eventually, average overconfidence will increase, but this occurs in a 
region that contains a relatively small measure of citizens. Thus, the covariance to 
the left will be either small and negative or small and positive, depending on the 
25 Simulations indicate this holds for all  ρ >  ρ i .  ρ close to one is needed for tractability. 
Table 4—Overconfidence Is a Substantively Important Predictor  
of Ideology and Ideological Extremeness
A one standard deviation 
change in __________
A ___ standard deviation
change in ideology, and
A ___ standard deviation
change in extremeness
is associated with Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Income 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.28
Education 0.10 0.20  < 0.01 0.25
Union member 0.01 0.07  < 0.01 0.08
Home owner 0.02 0.17  < 0.01 0.15
Stock owner 0.06 0.14  < 0.01 0.27
Overconfidence 0.17 0.24 0.12 0.26
Notes: The minimum and maximum effect size come from regressions with no other vari-
ables, and all other variables, respectively, across the three different measures of ideology and 
extremeness. These specifications can be found in the online Appendix. For the controls, we 
consider extremeness measures both that have, and have not, been purged of the economic 
effect on ideology. Effect sizes for categorical variables are based on entering them linearly 
in regressions.
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relative measure of citizens in the regions with positive and negative covariances. 
Either way, the covariance between overconfidence and ideological extremeness 
will be smaller for left-of-center citizens than right-of-center citizens.
A similar logic underlies Proposition 5: fixing  ρ i , then by Proposition 1 overcon-
fidence is increasing in  n . Moreover, mean ideology increases in  n —if Implication 1 
holds—as does the variance of ideology—if Implication 2 holds—producing similar 
patterns to the left panel of Figure 3.
Empirical Analysis.—Initial support for the first part of Proposition 4 comes from 
a comparison of the left panel of Figure 3, generated by theory, and the right panel 
of Figure 3, generated from the data. A statistical analysis is found in the first panel 
of Table 5, which finds that ideological extremeness has a substantially higher cova-
riance with overconfidence for those to the right of center than for those to the left 
of center, in accordance with Proposition 4. Proposition 5 also finds support in the 
statistical examination of Table 5. The final two columns control for age when test-
ing the proposition using media, and control for media when testing the proposition 
using age. This emphasizes that although patterns in ideology with respect to media 
exposure and age may look similar, they are driven by distinct underlying variation. 
It should be noted that while specular results hold if  x < 0 , these examinations 
are still tests of our model. In particular, the pattern in the left panel of Figure 3 is by 
Implication 1 ( x > 0 ), derived from the fact that ideology is increasing with media 
exposure. Indeed, it may be surprising that the data matches the implication of the 
theory as closely as it does in Figure 3. Propositions 4 and 5 provide a way to state, 
and test, this relationship statistically.
These patterns emphasize that our results are not driven by the relationship 
between overconfidence and ideology. Specifically, if overconfidence leads directly 
to conservatism, there should be a negative relationship between extremism and 
overconfidence for those left of center.26 No such pattern exists in Table 5. Moreover, 
26 Formally, this would be modeled as   i = g( κ i ) with  g ′ > 0 . 
Figure 3. The Theoretical Structure of Proposition 4, and the Data Used to Examine It
Notes: In the first panel, distribution of ideologies for three levels of overconfidence when x > 0. In the second 
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given the relationship between overconfidence and the number of signals in Table 2 
(that is,  d κ i /d n i > 0 ), there should be a negative relationship between extremism 
and the number of signals for those left of center. This, too, does not find support. 
This implies that the mechanism we have identified applies to both liberals and con-
servatives. This point is discussed further in Ortoleva and Snowberg (forthcoming).
D. Covariances and the Number of Signals
Previous subsections have examined various elements of our theory: signals (age 
and media), correlational neglect (overconfidence), and ideological extremeness in 
a pairwise fashion. Our final proposition brings these elements together.
PROPOSITION 6: If   ρ is large enough, then  cov[,  κ i − κ |  n i ] is increasing in  n i .
This proposition holds because the proportion of extremism and overconfidence that 
is due to signals—as opposed to priors or preference biases—is increasing in  n i . 
Importantly, as examining this proposition relies on grouping together citizens who 
Table 5—There Is a Greater Covariance between Extremeness and Overconfidence  
for Right-of-Center Citizens than Left-of-Center Citizens
Scaled extremeness (from ideology, purged of economic controls)
Left of Right of Left of Right of Left of Right of
center center center center center center
Covariance with 0.063** 0.28*** 0.012 0.18*** −0.014 0.11***







Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of signals Yes Yes
Covariance with 0.19*** 0.33*** 0.096*** 0.20*** 0.085*** 0.16***







Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age (73 categories) Yes Yes
Covariance 0.10*** 0.21*** 0.065*** 0.16*** 0.067*** 0.14***







Economic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Media (16 categories) Yes Yes
Observations 1,123 1,745 1,123 1,745 1,123 1,745
Notes: One-tailed test used for differences, with standard errors, clustered by age (73 clusters), in parentheses. The 
Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem is used to compute conditional covariances. Age is standardized in these regres-
sions. Similar results hold using partial correlations. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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all have the same level of media exposure, whatever causes that particular level of 
exposure is held constant.27
Empirical Analysis.—We begin by breaking our sample into quartiles by level of 
media exposure, and then calculating the covariance between ideological extreme-
ness and overconfidence for each quartile. The patterns in Table 6 are broadly sup-
portive of Proposition 6. However, testing the proposition pushes the limits of our 
data—most differences are not statistically significant. Indeed, as the standard errors 
on the differences between quartiles are approximately 0.06, this means that differ-
ences of covariances must be about 0.1 to obtain statistical significance. This is close 
to the maximum difference in covariances between subgroups.
Including controls gives a difference between the first and fourth quartile of 0.12 
(s.e. = 0.064,   p < 0.05 ). Dividing the sample quartiles in age produces a difference 
of 0.13 (s.e. = 0.095,   p < 0.1 ) without controls, and 0.079 (s.e. = 0.089,   p = 0.19 ) 
with controls.
IV. Turnout and Partisan Identification
We now turn to analyze different dependent variables: voter turnout and partisan 
identification. To analyze these behaviors, we must first specify how citizens make 
these political choices. Specifically, we posit an expressive voter model in which the 
expressive value of voting is increasing with a citizen’s belief that one party’s policy 
is better for her, and then move to examine the implications of this model theoreti-
cally and empirically.
27 Note this is not an issue when age is used as a measure of the number of signals. 
Table 6—The Covariance between Overconfidence and Ideological Extremeness Are Increasing in n
Quartile of media exposure: Lowest 2nd lowest 2nd highest Highest
cov  [,  κ i − κ | n] 0.13** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.27***(0.063) (0.045) (0.038) (0.045)
Inter-quartile 0.058 0.0035 0.079*
 difference (0.074) (0.059) (0.059)
Two quartile 0.061 0.083*
 difference (0.077) (0.059)
Three quartile 0.14**
 difference (0.078)
Observations 512 719 1,169 468
Notes: One-tailed test used for differences, with standard errors, clustered by age (73 clusters), in parentheses. All 
specifications estimated using WLS with CCES sampling weights. Unequal quartile sizes come from the use of 
sampling weights and the lumpiness of the media exposure measure. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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A. Formalization
Turnout and partisan identification will depend on the policy positions adopted 
by parties. We assume that there are two parties committed to platforms  L and  R , 
with  L = −R .28 Denote by  U j  ( b i | x) the utility that a citizen with preference bias 
b i receives from the platform of party  j when the state is  x . Party  R ’s position will 
be better for citizen  i in state  x when  U R ( b i | x) >  U L ( b i | x) . As in the description 
above, we assume citizen  i turns out to vote if and only if
(2)  | Pr i [ U R ( b i | x) >  U L ( b i | x)] −  1 _2| −  c i > 0 , 
where  c i ∼  F c is the idiosyncratic cost of turning out to vote. We assume  F c strictly 
increasing on  (0,  1 _2) , and  c i ⊥ ( b i ,  ρ i ,  e it ) . The online Appendix shows that (2) 
produces the same comparative statics as the canonical voting model of Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968) with a large electorate, and regret- or choice-avoidant voters 
(Matsusaka 1995; Degan and Merlo 2011).29
Finally, we model strength of partisan identification using the left-hand side of 
(2), but with a (possibly different) distribution of costs  F c ′ .30
B. Predictions
This model of turnout gives several predictions:
PROPOSITION 7: Conditional on  n :
 (i ) More ideologically extreme citizens are more likely to turn out to vote.
 (ii ) Conditional on overconfidence, more ideologically extreme citizens are more 
likely to turn out.
 (iii ) More overconfident citizens are more likely to turn out, both conditional on, 
and independent of, ideological extremeness.
 If  ρ is large then these predictions also hold independent of   n .
The first part of Proposition 7 is a well-documented empirical regularity: more 
ideologically extreme citizens are more likely to turn out. The second part of 
Proposition 7 makes a stronger prediction: more ideologically extreme citizens are 
more likely to turn out, even controlling for overconfidence. The left panel of Figure 
4 helps build intuition. It depicts the posterior of two citizens with the same level of 
28 Symmetric divergence can be generated from a Calvert (1985) model with policy and office motivated parties 
that are uncertain about the median voter’s ideology due to the random realization of  x . 
29 Note that Riker and Ordeshook (1968) contains both a pivotal and expressive component. In large elections 
the expressive component dominates. It is straightforward to see that (2) is consistent with regret-avoidance. As 
discussed in Degan and Merlo (2011), it is also consistent with choice-avoidance if voters will never learn whether 
their choice is correct or not. For a deeper discussion of these points, see the online Appendix. 
30 We adopt this formulation to simplify and shorten the exposition. Identical predictions are obtained from a 
more complex model of partisan identification discussed in the online Appendix. 
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 overconfidence, but different ideologies. While both prefer  R to  L , the more extreme 
citizen assigns a higher probability to  R having the correct policy, and hence is more 
likely to turn out.
The third part of Proposition 7 describes the role of overconfidence in turnout: more 
overconfident citizens are more likely to turn out, even controlling for ideology. The 
intuition is apparent from the right panel of Figure 4, which shows the posterior of 
two citizens, both with  b = 0 and the same posterior mean beliefs  E i [x] , but different 
levels of overconfidence. While both prefer  R to  L , the more overconfident citizen 
assigns a higher probability to  R having the correct policy, and hence, is more likely 
to turn out.
Note that this provides an alternative explanation as to why right-leaning and 
older people are more likely to vote: because they are more overconfident. This 
contrasts with explanations in the literature that attribute these patterns to increased 
income changing the cost or benefits of voting, or even feelings of increased patrio-
tism among those groups.31
The final predictions examined in the survey data concern the strength of partisan 
identification. These results follow directly from Proposition 7, as (2) characterizes 
both turnout and partisan identification.
COROLLARY 1: Conditional on  n , strength of partisan identification is increasing 
in overconfidence, both conditional on, and independent of, ideological extremeness. 
Moreover, strength of partisan identification is increasing in ideological extreme-
ness, both conditional on, and independent of, overconfidence. If  ρ is large enough, 
these results hold independent of  n .
C. Empirical Analysis
We examine Proposition 7 using verified voter turnout from the 2010 CCES.32 
The results, shown in Table 7, are supportive of the proposition: columns 3 and 4 
31 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
32 One of the advantages of the CCES dataset is that it provides verified voter turnout in addition to self-reported 
turnout, which is known to be unreliable. Our results also hold, and indeed are stronger, if we use self-reported 
turnout. 
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show that more ideologically extreme citizens are more likely to vote, even condi-
tional on overconfidence; and more overconfident citizens are more likely to vote, 
even conditional on ideological extremeness.33 Moreover, in columns 5–7, we show 
that these patterns hold even conditioning on the number of signals,  n . However, 
when the economic controls are added to all of the theoretical controls, in column 9, 
the result remains positive, but loses statistical significance.
To get a full accounting of the effect of overconfidence on turnout, we need to 
first account for the fact that overconfidence also leads to ideological extremeness. 
Doing so, a one standard deviation increase in overconfidence is associated with a 
15–19 percent (depending on the specification) increase in turnout: a 7.5–9.5 per-
centage point increase versus a baseline turnout rate of 51 percent in the data. This 
effect is substantively important as it is larger than the effect of income, educa-
tion, union membership, and over half of the effect size associated with ideological 
extremeness and age—all known to be important correlates of turnout.
We now examine partisan identification. As noted in Section IIB, we construct 
three measures of partisan identification, all of which code someone who identifies 
as a “Strong Democrat” or “Strong Republican” as a strong partisan identifier (1), 
and most others as weak partisan identifiers (0). The three measures differ in how 
they treat those who identify as “independent.” The first matches theory and codes 
independents as weak partisan identifiers (0). However, it has been suggested that 
independents may also hold strongly to that identity, so we show that our results are 
robust to this possibility, first by coding them as strong partisan identifiers (1), and 
then by dropping these respondents (·).
Table 8 then regresses these measures on overconfidence, ideological extreme-
ness, economic controls, and controls for the number of signals. The results are 
consistent with theory, no matter which measure is used. Doing the same accounting 
33 Ideological extremeness here is not purged of economic effects, as our theoretical results are stated con-
ditional on extremeness, not extremeness without wealth or income effects. Using the purged measure produces 
nearly identical results. 
Table 7—Turnout Is Increasing with Overconfidence and Ideological Extremeness
Turnout decision
Overconfidence 0.096*** 0.056*** 0.61*** 0.068** 0.066*** 0.026* 0.029* 0.014
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Ideological 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.13***
Extremeness (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
Economic controls Yes Yes Yes
Media (16 categories) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age (73 categories) Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.037 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.29 0.31 0.36
Observations 2,808
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by age (73 clusters), in parentheses. All specifications estimated using WLS with 
CCES sampling weights.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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exercise as above, a one standard deviation change in overconfidence is associated 
with a 9–15 percent increase in the probability a respondent classifies themselves 
as strongly partisan: a 4.5–6 percentage point increase from a mean rate of 36 per-
cent, 42 percent, and 51 percent, respectively, for the three different measures. This 
is 45–95 percent of the effect size associated with ideological extremeness. Note 
again that the controls that strongly affect the results are those that have a theoretical 
role—ideological extremeness, age, and media exposure.
One other pattern in Table 8 is worth noting: ideological extremeness is a worse 
predictor of strength of partisan identification when independents are treated as 
strong partisan identifiers. Intuitively, there are few respondents who hold extremely 
conservative or liberal views, but identify as independent.
Table 8—Overconfidence Is Correlated with Strength of Partisan Identification,  
Even Controlling for Ideological Extremeness and Number of Signals
Strength of partisan identification
Panel A. Independents treated as weak partisan identifiers (0)
Overconfidence 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.027* 0.040*** 0.030**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Ideological 0.11*** 0.12***
 extremeness (0.015) (0.014)
Economic controls Yes Yes
Number of signals Yes Yes
R2 0.012 0.084 0.062 0.085 0.18
Observations 2,868
Panel B. Independents treated as strong partisan identifiers (1)
Overconfidence 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.038** 0.034** 0.037**
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Ideological 0.052*** 0.066***
 extremeness (0.015) (0.015)
Economic controls Yes Yes
Number of signals Yes Yes
R2 0.0097 0.074 0.020 0.081 0.15
Observations 2,868
Panel C. Independents treated as missing data (·)
Overconfidence 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.038** 0.044*** 0.039***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Ideological 0.10*** 0.11***
 extremeness (0.017) (0.015)
Economic controls Yes Yes
Number of signals Yes Yes
R2 0.015 0.098 0.054 0.091 0.19
Observations 2,545
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by age (73 clusters), in parentheses. All specifications estimated using WLS with 
CCES sampling weights.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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V. Other Sources of Information
In this section we examine how relaxing our assumptions about the sources of 
information would affect our primary results. First, we consider the case in which 
citizens choose the number of costly signals to acquire. Second, we consider the 
effects of citizens sharing their ideologies with each other. In both cases we find that 
these extensions strengthen our results.
A. Endogenous Information Acquisition
In standard models, risk-averse citizens acquire information to reduce their uncer-
tainty about the state  x . In these models, more confident citizens would demand 
fewer signals—in our context, less media. However, in our model more overconfi-
dent citizens acquire more information. Moreover, endogenizing information acqui-
sition strengthens our primary result.
To formalize, define the cost of acquiring a signal as  c , and a citizen’s perceived 
optimal number of signals as  n i ∗ . Further, define  V i  ( κ i |  n i ) as the value to citizen  i , 
with overconfidence  κ i , of an additional signal, given that she has already received 
n i signals. Then:
PROPOSITION 8:
 (i )  V i ( κ i |  n i ) is increasing in  κ i .
 (ii )  n i ∗ is increasing in the degree of correlational neglect.
The first part of Proposition 8 may seem counterintuitive: why would someone who 
believes they are more certain of the state place a greater value on the additional 
information? The intuition comes from the second part: as more overconfident cit-
izens neglect correlation to a greater degree, they believe additional signals have 
more information, and thus value.
The second part of Proposition 8 is consistent with the first panel of Figure 1: 
media exposure is increasing in overconfidence. It also has an additional implication: 
endogenizing media exposure reinforces the relationship between overconfidence 
and extremeness found in Proposition 2. This occurs because those with a greater 
degree of correlational neglect are now more overconfident and more extreme for 
two reasons: correlational neglect and increased media consumption.
B. Communication between Citizens
What if citizens could learn the point of view of citizens outside their network, or 
receive information from public sources? In this subsection, we show theoretically 
that this would, interestingly, strengthen the correlation between overconfidence 
and ideological extremeness. This occurs because when more overconfident citi-
zens meet someone with a different ideology, they attribute this difference to factors 
other than the information possessed by the other citizen—as, by construction, they 
believe that “they know better.” Therefore, more overconfident citizens will tend 
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to update less than less overconfident citizens, making more overconfident citizens 
relatively more extreme.
We illustrate this pattern in two ways. First we consider citizens with arbitrary 
preference biases,  b i , who are unaware that other citizens may be overconfident. 
Second, citizens are aware that others may be overconfident, but there are no prefer-
ence biases ( b i = 0 ,  ∀ i ). In the first case, citizens will attribute disagreement to the 
bias of others; in the second, they will attribute it to others’ overconfidence. More 
overconfident citizens will attribute more of the difference to these other factors.
Throughout this section, we assume that after  n private signals, each citizen  i 
meets another, randomly chosen, citizen  j and is told her ideology. It is straightfor-
ward to extend the analysis to citizens meeting any finite number of other citizens, 
or observing any finite number of public signals with known precision.34
Unawareness of Overconfidence.—As noted above, we begin by assuming citi-
zens are unaware of overconfidence.
PROPOSITION 9: When citizen  i is told the ideology of citizen  j , and she believes 
κ j = κ :
 (i ) The ideology of citizen  i after communication is  α i   i +  β i   j for some  α i , β i ∈  ℝ ++ , where  α i is increasing in  κ i and  β i is decreasing in  κ i .
 (ii ) If   j ≠ (  i −  b i )  κ ____ κ + τ , then  i ’s mean belief about the extremeness of  j ’s 
preferences is increasing in  i ’s level of overconfidence,  
d| E i [ b j ]| _____
d κ i  > 0 .
When  i meets  j , she knows that the difference in their ideologies may have two 
sources: different preference biases and different information. The more overcon-
fident citizen  i is, the more confident she is that she and  j received similar signals. 
Thus, she believes their difference in ideologies is due to differences in preference 
biases. In turn, this leads  i to only slightly update her beliefs.
This intuition also characterizes how overconfident citizens would update in the 
face of media reports contradicting their point of view. As long as there is some 
chance that the media is biased, more overconfident citizens will attribute the con-
tradiction to media bias, and, hence, update less.
No Preference Biases.—Next, we consider the case in which citizens are (cor-
rectly) aware of the fact that others are overconfident. For simplicity, we assume that 
all citizens have no preference bias ( b i = 0 ,  ∀ i ), and that this is common knowledge. 
34 Matching with like-minded individuals is encompassed by correlational neglect. If there is uncertainty about 
the distribution of overconfidence in the population, or the mean preference bias in the population, our results 
extend to public signals regarding the distribution of ideology. 
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Define  F  κ i  as the distribution of posterior precisions in the population, and 
 κ ¯ = inf { y |  F  κ i  (y) > 0} , then:
PROPOSITION 10: Suppose  b i = 0 ,  ∀ i . When citizen  i is told the ideology of cit-
izen  j :
 (i ) The ideology of citizen  i after communication is  γ i   i +  δ i   j for some  γ i , δ i ∈  ℝ ++ , where  γ i is increasing in  κ i and  δ i is decreasing in  κ i .
 (ii )  E i [ κ j ] is increasing in  κ i if  i and  j are on opposite sides of the aisle, (  i ×   j < 0 ) or if  j is more ideological extreme than  i (  j >   i ).
 (iii )  E i [ κ j ] is decreasing in  κ i if  i and  j are on the same side of the aisle 
(  i ×   j > 0 ), and   i >  τ +  κ ¯ ____ κ ¯   j .
Proposition 10 has a similar form, and intuition, to Proposition 9. When a cit-
izen meets someone with a different ideology, she can attribute the difference to 
either differences in information, or in how the other citizen processes information. 
Following the logic above, more overconfident citizens attribute more of the differ-
ence to other citizens’ overconfidence.
However, the other parts of Proposition 10 are more nuanced. In particular, if 
the other citizen is more extreme, or is on the other side of the aisle, the first citizen 
attributes this to overconfidence. But when the other citizen is on the same side of 
the aisle but is less extreme, the first citizen believes that the other underinterprets 
her information: that is, she “lacks the courage of her convictions.”
Proposition 9 and 10 both imply that communication causes more overconfident 
citizens to have relatively more dispersed ideologies. This leads to a greater correla-
tion between overconfidence and ideological extremeness.
Finally, these results allow us to briefly consider a puzzle presented in the intro-
duction: why political rumors and misinformation are so persistent. Our model sug-
gests a possible answer: it is very difficult to persuade overconfident citizens that 
their prior is incorrect, as they tend to attribute contradictory information to others’ 
biases.
VI. Discussion: Identification and Future Directions
We conclude with a summary of our major results, and then turn to a discussion 
of identification and directions for future research.
This paper introduces a model of correlational neglect leading to overconfidence, 
and draws implications for political behavior. In particular, the model predicts that 
overconfidence and extremism are positively correlated, that both overconfidence 
and ideological extremism are independently correlated with voter turnout, that 
overconfidence is increasing with the number of signals—that is, age and media 
exposure—and that, moreover, the correlation between ideology and overconfi-
dence is increasing in the number of signals. Taking into account the findings of 
Section IIIA, the model makes additional predictions: ideology and overconfidence 
are positively correlated, the covariance between extremism and overconfidence is 
531ortoleva and snowberg: overconfidence in political behaviorvol. 105 no. 2
greater for those right-of-center than left-of-center, and that the covariance between 
media exposure and the number of signals is greater for those right-of-center than 
left-of-center. These implications are examined using unique survey data. All find 
support in this data, most at very high levels of statistical significance, and when 
controlling for the number of signals and all available economic factors.
A. Identification
For our results to be identified, correlational neglect must be something akin to 
a personality trait: set early in life, with changes unrelated to political conditions. 
While this is plausible, it is not testable with our data. However, we can gain deeper 
insight by considering two classes of threats to identification: reverse causality and 
third-factor causation.
One might object that the factual questions used to measure overconfidence are 
inherently ideological, and thus extremeness causes confident responses. While 
Ansolabehere, Meredith, and Snowberg (2014) do not find partisan differences in 
factual answers, we have also examined other ways of eliciting overconfidence. 
Specifically, we were allowed to place a few questions on the 2011 CCES that 
would measure overconfidence on general knowledge items, such as the year of 
Shakespeare’s birth and the population of Spain. Moreover, confidence was elic-
ited using a confidence interval, similar to the method used in the psychology lit-
erature. While the 2011 survey is limited in other ways—it was much shorter and 
smaller, only allowed for self-reported ideology, and did not contain voter turnout 
data—we can use it to examine the central relationship between extremeness and 
overconfidence.
Table 9 shows that the results are substantively unchanged in the 2011 data, 
and that the results using the different measures of overconfidence are statistically 
indistinguishable.35 We believe this should eliminate concerns that the correlation 
between extremeness and overconfidence is driven by the questions we use to mea-
sure overconfidence.
However, there may be something else causing both ideology and overconfidence: 
for example, particular patterns of brain or social development. To our knowledge, 
the literature does not suggest any obvious third factors that would explain all of our 
empirical findings. If such a third factor is found, it would clearly be very important. 
Even if that occurs, we believe our results will still provide useful insights into the 
relationship between overconfidence and political characteristics. Indeed, as cor-
relational neglect is a third factor in this sense, it may turn out that this something 
else is a set of mechanisms underlying correlational neglect.
B. Future Directions
This returns us to the introduction, where we noted two puzzles, and suggest that 
a behavioral basis for ideology promises to deepen our understanding of political 
institutions. The first puzzle was why political polarization has seemed to increase 
35 To reduce bias due to measurement error, we can instrument one measure with the other. This increases coef-
ficients by approximately a factor of three (see Ortoleva and Snowberg forthcoming). 
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with an increase in access to information. As noted in Section IIIA, our theory pro-
vides a potential answer: if additional signals are correlated such that the increase 
in the number of signals is greater than the increase in information, this will lead to 
greater polarization. The second puzzle concerned the durability of political rumors 
and misinformation. As noted at the end of Section VB, a related mechanism may be 
responsible: overconfident citizens will tend to attribute contradictory information 
to the biases of others rather than to their own misinformation.
Understanding how these patterns interact with institutions must be left to future 
work, however, we illustrate the usefulness of our findings by sketching a model of 
primaries with overconfident voters (Ortoleva and Snowberg 2015b). Two parties 
have primaries to nominate candidates for executive office. Between the primaries 
and the general election, nature will send each voter a signal of the state. It is well 
known that primary voters are more ideologically extreme than the general elector-
ate. Based on the evidence presented above, these voters are also more overconfi-
dent. Thus, although primary voters know the ideology of the median voter at the 
time of the primary, they expect nature’s signals to agree with their beliefs, drawing 
the median voter toward their ideology. This implies that primary voters will select 
candidates on opposite sides of the median voter, expecting nature’s signal to pull 
the median voter toward the more extreme position of the primary voters. Moreover, 
the losing candidates’ partisans will think the median voter ignored “the truth.” We 
believe this sketch provides some insight into the nomination of, and partisan reac-
tions to the defeat of John Kerry in 2004 and Mitt Romney in 2012.
Table 9—A General Knowledge-Based Measure  
of Overconfidence Produces the Same Results
Self-reported ideological extremeness  
(“don’t know” treated as centrist)
Overconfidence 0.16*** 0.11***
 (economy) (0.047) (0.040)
Overconfidence 0.17*** 0.12**
 (general knowledge) (0.043) (0.050)
Economic controls Yes Yes
Number of signals Yes Yes
R2 0.024 0.32 0.030 0.32
Observations 989
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by age (69 clusters), in parentheses. All specifications esti-
mated using WLS with CCES sampling weights. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
533ortoleva and snowberg: overconfidence in political behaviorvol. 105 no. 2
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Achen, Christopher H. 1992. “Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear Regression: 
Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research.” Political Behavior 14 (3): 195–211.
Alesina, Alberto, and George-Marios Angeletos. 2005. “Fairness and Redistribution.” American Eco-
nomic Review 95 (4): 960–80.  
Alpert, Marc, and Howard Raiffa.1982. “A Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors.” 
In Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, 
and Amos Tversky, 294–305. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Alvarez, R. Michael. 2010. “Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2010: Caltech Content.” [Computer File] Release 1: February 26, 2012. Pasadena, CA: California Institute of Technology [producer] http://cces.gov.harvard.edu (accessed March 1, 2012).
Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2010a. “Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2010: Harvard/MIT Con-
tent.” [Computer File] Release 1: February 26, 2012. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University [pro-
ducer] http://cces.gov.harvard.edu (accessed March 1, 2012).
Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2010b. “Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2010: Common Content.” [Computer File] Release 1: February 26, 2012. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University [producer] 
http://cces.gov.harvard.edu (accessed March 1, 2012).
Ansolabehere, Stephen. 2012. “Guide to the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey.” http://
hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17705.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Eitan Hersh. 2010. “The Quality of Voter Registration Records: A State-
by-State Analysis.” Unpublished.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, Marc Meredith, and Erik Snowberg. 2013. “Asking About Numbers: Why and 
How.” Political Analysis 21 (1): 48–69.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, Marc Meredith, and Erik Snowberg. 2014. “Mecro-Economic Voting: Local 
Information and Micro-Perceptions of the Macro-Economy.” Economics & Politics 26 (3): 380–410.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Douglas Rivers. 2013. “Cooperative Survey Research.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 16: 307–29.
Athey, Susan, and Philip A. Haile. 2007. “Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions.” In Handbook of 
Econometrics, Vol. 6A, edited by James J. Heckman and Edward E. Leamer, 3847–3965. Amster-
dam: Elsevier.
Baker, Malcolm, and Jeffrey Wurgler. 2013. “Behavioral Corporate Finance: An Updated Survey.” In 
Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Vol. 2A, edited by George M. Constantinides, Milton Har-
ris, and René M. Stulz, 357–424. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Bénabou, Roland. 2008. “Ideology: Joseph Schumpeter Lecture.” Journal of the European Economic 
Association 6 (2-3): 321–52.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2002. “Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation.” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 117 (3): 871–915.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2006. “Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 121 (2): 699–746.
Bendor, Jonathan, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, and Michael M. Ting. 2011. A Behavioral Theory 
of Elections. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bendor, Jonathan, Daniel Diermeier, and Michael Ting. 2003. “A Behavioral Model of Turnout.” 
American Political Science Review 97 (2): 261–80.
Benoît, Jean-Pierre, and Juan Dubra. 2011. “Apparent Overconfidence.” Econometrica 79 (5): 1591–
1625.
Berinsky, Adam. 2012. “Rumors, Truths, and Reality: A Study of Political Misinformation.” Unpub-
lished.
Bertrand, Marianne. 2009. “CEOs.” Annual Review of Economics 1 (1): 121–49.
Bisin, Alberto, Alessandro Lizzeri, and Leeat Yariv. Forthcoming. “Government Policy with Time Incon-
sistent Voters.” American Economic Review.
Blomberg, S. Brock, and Joseph E. Harrington Jr. 2000. “A Theory of Rigid Extremists and Flexible 
Moderates with an Application to the U.S. Congress.” American Economic Review 90 (3): 605–20.
Bullock, John G. 2009. “Partisan Bias and the Bayesian Ideal in the Study of Public Opinion.” Journal 
of Politics 71 (3): 1109–24.
Callander, Steven. 2007. “Bandwagons and Momentum in Sequential Voting.” Review of Economic 
Studies 74 (3): 653–84.
Callander, Steven, and Catherine H. Wilson. 2006. “Context-Dependent Voting.” Quarterly Journal of 
Political Science 1 (3): 227–54.
534 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW fEbRuARy 2015
Callander, Steven, and Catherine H. Wilson. 2008. “Context-dependent Voting and Political Ambigu-
ity.” Journal of Public Economics 92 (3): 565–81.
Calvert, Randall L. 1985. “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, 
Uncertainty, and Convergence.” American Journal of Political Science 29 (1): 69–95.
Camerer, Colin, and Dan Lovallo. 1999. “Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental 
Approach.” American Economic Review 89 (1): 306–18.
Chandrasekhar, Arun G., Horacio Larreguy, and Juan Pablo Xandri. 2012. “Testing Models of Social 
Learning on Networks: Evidence from a Framed Field Experiment.” Unpublished.
Chen, Xiaohong. 2007. “Large Sample Sieve Estimation of Semi-Nonparametric Models.” In Hand-
book of Econometrics, Vol. 6B, edited by James J. Heckman and Edward E. Leamer, 5549–5632. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. 1998. “Investor Psychology and 
Security Market Under- and Overreactions.” Journal of Finance 53 (6): 1839–85.
Degan, Arianna. 2013. “Civic Duty and Political Advertising.” Economic Theory 52 (2): 531–64.
Degan, Arianna, and Antonio Merlo. 2011. “A Structural Model of Turnout and Voting in Multiple 
Elections.” Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (2): 209–45.
DeGroot, Morris H. 1974. “Reaching a Consensus.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 
69 (345): 118–21.
DeMarzo, Peter M., Dimitri Vayanos, and Jeffrey Zwiebel. 2003. “Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, 
and Unidimensional Opinions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (3): 909–68.
Enke, Benjamin, and Florian Zimmermann. 2013. “Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation.” IZA 
Discussion Paper Number 7372.
Erev, Ido, Thomas S. Wallsten, and David V. Budescu. 1994. “Simultaneous Over- and Underconfi-
dence: The Role of Error in Judgment Processes.” Psychological Review 101 (3): 519–27.
Eyster, Erik, and Matthew Rabin. 2010. “Naïve Herding in Rich-Information Settings.” American 
Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2 (4): 221–43.
Frank, Thomas. 2004. What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives won the Heart of America. 
New York: Metropolitan Books.
Gelman, Andrew. 2009. Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way 
They Do. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gentzkow, Matthew, and Jesse M. Shapiro. 2011. “Ideological Segregation Online and Offline.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 126 (4): 1799–1839.
Glaeser, Edward L., and Cass R. Sunstein. 2009. “Extremism and Social Learning.” Journal of Legal 
Analysis 1 (1): 263–324.
Golub, Benjamin, and Matthew O. Jackson. 2010. “Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wis-
dom of Crowds.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2 (1): 112–49.
Henderson, Daniel J., John A. List, Daniel L. Millimet, Christopher F. Parmeter, and Michael K. Price. 
2009. “Imposing Monotonicity Nonparametrically in First-Price Auctions.” Unpublished.
Kuklinski, James H., Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, David Schwieder, and Robert F. Rich. 2000. “Mis-
information and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship.” Journal of Politics 62 (3): 790–816.
Levy, Gilat, and Ronny Razin. Forthcoming. “Correlation Neglect, Voting Behaviour and Polarization.” 
American Economic Review.
Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Leeat Yariv. Forthcoming. “Collective Self-Control.” American Economic Review.
Lundeberg, Mary A., Paul W. Fox, and Judith Punc´cohar´. 1994. “Highly Confident but Wrong: 
Gender Differences and Similarities in Confidence Judgments.” Journal of Educational Psychology 
86 (1): 114–21.
Matsusaka, John G. 1995. “Explaining Voter Turnout Patterns: An Information Theory.” Public Choice 
84 (1-2): 91–117.
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ide-
ology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
McMurray, Joseph C. 2013a. “Ideology as Opinion: A Spatial Model of Common-value Elections.” 
Unpublished.
McMurray, Joseph C. 2013b. “Why the Political World is Flat: An Endogenous Left-Right Spectrum 
in Multidimensional Political Competition.” Unpublished.
Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. 1981. “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” Journal 
of Political Economy 89 (5): 914–27.
Moore, Don A., and Paul J. Healy. 2007. “The Trouble with Overconfidence.” Unpublished.
Moore, Don A., and Paul J. Healy. 2008. “The Trouble with Overconfidence.” Psychological Review 
115 (2): 502–17.
Odean, Terrance. 1998. “Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders are Above Average.” 
Journal of Finance 53 (6): 1887–1934.
535ORTOLEVA AND SNOWBERG: OVERCONFIDENCE IN POLITICAL BEHAVIORVOL. 105 NO. 2
Ortoleva, Pietro, and Erik Snowberg. 2013. “Overconfidence in Political Behavior.” National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper 19250.
Ortoleva, Pietro, and Erik Snowberg. 2015a. “Overconfidence in Political Behavior: Dataset.” Ameri-
can Economic Review. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130921.
Ortoleva, Pietro, and Erik Snowberg. 2015b. “They’ll See! Primaries with Overconfident Voters.” 
Unpublished.
Ortoleva, Pietro, and Erik Snowberg.  Forthcoming. “Are Conservatives Overconfident?” European 
Journal of Political Economy.
Passarelli, Francesco, and Guido Tabellini. 2013. “Emotions and Political Unrest.” CESifo Working 
Paper 4165.
Piketty, Thomas. 1995. “Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics.” Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 110 (3): 551–84.
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis.” 
American Journal of Political Science 29 (2): 357–84.
Public Policy Polling. 2013. “Democrats and Republicans Differ on Conspiracy Theory Beliefs.” News 
release, April 2, 2013. http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_National_
ConspiracyTheories_040213.pdf.
Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” American 
Political Science Review 62 (1): 25–42.
Santos-Pinto, Luís, and Joel Sobel. 2005. “A Model of Positive Self-Image in Subjective Assessments.” 
American Economic Review 95 (5): 1386–1402.
Tausanovitch, Chris, and Christopher Warshaw. 2011. “Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in 
Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities.” Journal of Politics 75 (2): 330–42.
Weingast, Barry R. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” American 
Political Science Review 91 (2): 245–63.
Yale Project on Climate Change Communication. 2013. “Scientific and Public Perspectives on Climate 
Change.” http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/files/ClimateNote_Consensus_Gap_
May2013_FINAL6.pdf.
Zechman, Martin J. 1979. “Dynamic Models of the Voter’s Decision Calculus: Incorporating Ret-
rospective Considerations into Rational-Choice Models of Individual Voting Behavior.” Public 
Choice 34 (3-4): 297–315.
